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Abstract 
We present a framework for deriving shadow prices for negative environmental impacts regulated in 
agriculture. The shadow prices can be used as indicators of the costs of environmental regulation imposed 
as  reflected  in  alternative  farming  technologies  adopted.  We  illustrate  our  analytical  findings  with 
implications of the Finnish water protection policy measures on conventional and organic livestock farms 
over the period 1994-2002. Generally, the representative organic farm is found to be more technically 
efficient relative to its own technology than is the conventional representative farm. However, there is no 
statistical indication of a difference between these two particular representative farms in valuing the costs 
of undesirable output (manure) at the margin. 
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1 Introduction 
Organic farming has become an important option for policies promoting food safety and environmental 
quality of food production. By ruling out the use of synthetic fertilizers and other chemicals organic 
farming represents an environmentally ‘clean’ technology which can be viewed as a constrained version 
of conventional farming in agriculture. However its potential environmental friendliness does not come 
without  a  cost.  Yields  in  organic  farming  are  in  general significantly lower than under conventional 
management, even though the yield differences vary between products and to a certain extent between 
countries. (Offerman and Nieberg, 2000; Zanoli and Gambelli 1999) 
 
Depending on the farming strategies adopted also the environmental impacts will change accordingly. It is 
necessary  to  evaluate  the  existing  measures  of  economic  performance  of  conventional  and  organic 
farming technologies from a point of view of environment, since conventional economic indicators may 
be  misguided.  We  provide  an  analytical  framework  for  measurement  of  shadow  prices  for 
environmentally detrimental outputs for agricultural sector using the opportunity cost of production. In 
other words, we assume implicitly that abatement is only possible by adjusting agricultural production, or 
output/value added at the farm level.  
 
The  shadow pricing is based on a straightforward  assumption  that the current regulation reflects the 
environmental preferences of the society. What is important for our purpose is to draw a distinction 
between good and bad outputs which has been recognized, e.g., by Färe and Grosskopf (1998, 2004) and 
Smith (1998). Our empirical application of shadow pricing has its origin in Färe et al. (2001, 2004). By 
exploiting the duality theory, the shadow prices can be derived from the output distance function using 
the envelope theorem. Since the cost for reducing bad outputs is in terms of forgone revenue from good 
outputs, each bad output commands its own shadow price at the margin. Shadow prices, or social costs, of 
environmentally detrimental outputs such as runoff of nutrients to watercourses can be estimated.  
 
To illustrate our analytical findings, we consider the implications of water protection policy measures in 
the Finnish agriculture. In purpose of alleviating leakage of nutrients to the waters, the authorities have 
imposed restrictions that limit the use of manure as a fertilizer. With certain exceptions, maximally 15 m
3 
manure is allowed to be spread per hectare cultivated land annually. If this policy measure is restrictive, 
the performance of the farms change as the environment becomes a factor to be taken into account in the 
economic maximization problem. Furthermore, since an undesirable by-product is produced its effects on 
the environment have negative welfare consequences that should be accounted for in monetary terms. The 
shadow price implicitly reveals the value that the regulatory authorities put on the last unit manure spread 
on land causing environmental damages. If the authorities know the environmental preferences of the 
society and know how and to what extent undesirable output affects the environment, the shadow price is 
the correct value from a socially optimal point of view. 
  
Our  farm-level  data  are  sampled  from  the  Finnish  FADN  network.  We  have  information  on  the 
technology  chosen (organic vs.  conventional), amounts of good output (value added) and bad output 
(manure) produced, and inputs of capital, labor, energy, land, and other materials used. Generally, our 
results  indicate  that  the  representative  organic  farm  is  more  technically  efficient  relative  to  its  own 
technological  frontier  than  is  the  conventional  representative  farm.  However,  there  is  no  statistical 
indication  of  a  difference  between  these  two  particular  representative  farms  in  valuing  bad  output 
(manure) at the margin. That is, the marginal abatement costs are equal, somewhere between FIM 449 – 
882. This means that we cannot reject the hypothesis of the Finnish authorities pursuing a cost efficient 
manure policy. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a simple optimization problem in which 
organic  nutrient  surplus,  or  manure,  is  an  environmentally  detrimental  by-product  of  all  agricultural 
production to such extent that it is regulated by environmental standards. We compare two different types 
of technologies, organic and conventional farming from a social point of view. In section 3, the empirical 
framework,  based  on  production  frontiers,  is  outlined,  including  the  shadow-pricing  methodology,   4 
empirical specification, and a brief description of empirical data. The results are presented in section 4 
and, finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2 Optimization framework for incorporating undesirable output in agricultural production 
Formally, a first best optimal solution can be derived by setting up a social planner' s utility maximization 
problem. The agricultural sector produces consumption goods C and G by using conventional and organic 
farming  technology,  respectively.  Therefore,  we  posit  two  production  functions  which  involve 
conventional production,  ) ; ( 1 1 K L f  and organic production,  ) ; ( 2 2 K L g . Both technologies utilize land 
(L1,L2), which is a variable input. The main difference in the production functions is the given technology, 
and sector specific capital denoted here by K
1. Simultaneously with production of goods, a bad output, b, 
causing environmental deterioration is generated such that  ), ; ( ) ; ( 2 2 2 1 1 1 K L g K L f b m m + =  where 1 m  
and  2 m   are  non-negative  coefficients.  The  environmentally  undesirable  output  can  be,  e.g.,  manure 
generated in animal production as excessive amounts of manure spoil recreation possibilities due to odors 
or water pollution impacts. The by-product causing nuisance shows up as an argument in the society’s 
objective function. The utility function takes the form U(C,G,b) with UC>0, UG>0, and Ub<0. 
 
For the maximization problem of the social planner, we write the Lagrangian  
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and the first order conditions  
(2)  0 / 1 = - = l ¶ ¶ C U C ￿       
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From (2), (4), and (5) the optimality necessitates that  
(7)    b
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to guarantee efficient input use in conventional farming. In particular, the environmental deterioration is 
optimal up to the point where the marginal utility value of the good output equals the sum of the direct 
marginal disutility (Ub < 0), which is proportional to the good output (by a factor  1 m ), and the private 
production cost (
1 / L f w ).  
 
Accordingly, equations (3), (4) and (6) determine optimal input use in organic farming 
                                                            
1 The capital stocks and technologies are given in our static analysis as we do not consider investment decisions. 
Distinguishing a separate production function for each technology reflects the fact that technologies are sector 
specific and two different types of capital stocks are used in different combinations of variable inputs. In fact, we 
cannot measure all inputs empirically, as the capital stocks include even know-how, or human capital including 
learning which can be critical for adopting new technologies (see, e.g., Sipiläinen et al 2005). In the analytical model, 
the differences in production technologies are simply captured by two distinct capital stocks, K1 and K2.  
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Hence,  organic  farming  technology  should  be  employed  up  to  the  point  where  both  the  direct 
production/input costs and disutility of an additional undesirable output is properly taken into account. 
Consequently, how much of each technology should optimally be adopted is determined by  
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As it is well-known from the environmental economics literature, the socially optimal solution can be 
attained in a market economy by using economic instruments that internalize the externality from the 
undesirable by-product of production. In the following, we show how government can use regulation 
imposing an environmental standard on the by-product. The standard becomes an implicit shadow price 
that corresponds to the value of the environmental externality, Ub. The shadow price also reflects the 
farm’s marginal abatement cost and, therefore, how stringent the standard is perceived by the farm. 
 
Assume that competitive farms are producing both conventional and organic products for market prices pC 
and pG, respectively. Production is regulated such that both technologies have a similar constraint for a 
maximum  amount  of  environmentally  detrimental  output,b ,  such  that  b K L f £ ) ; ( 1 1 1 m and 
b K L g £ ) ; ( 2 2 2 m . Given these constraints, the two representative farms maximize profits 
 
)) ; ( ( ) ; ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 K L f b q rL K L f p C C C m p - - - =     
)) ; ( ( ) ; ( 2 2 2 2 2 2 K L g b q rL K L g p G G G m p - - - =  
 
where  r  is  land  rent  and  qC  and  qG  are  shadow  prices  or  Lagrangian  multipliers.  The  optimality 
necessitates 
 
(10)  r f q f p L C L C = × + × ) ( ) (
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2 2 2 m  
 
such that the (accounting) prices can be expressed as 
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Rearranging we have  
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From (7) and (12) and (8) and (13), we have that uC and uG correspond to socially optimal prices if the 
externality, -Ub, is appropriately internalized or 
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These optimality conditions imply that regulation setting a constraint,B , on the undesirable by-product 
from producing conventional and organic output, corresponds to the shadow price on this particular by-
product,   C q  and  G q , which should be equal when the regulator is striving for cost efficient policy.  
 
This leads to a straightforward policy implication. If the negative environmental impacts, b U , are not 
accounted for, the conventional measures of economic performance will be misleading indicators, and 
there  will  be  no  incentive  to  adopt  a  socially  optimal  amount  of  environmental friendly technology. 
However, we can “translate” the environmental targets to economic indictors through shadow prices that 
reflect how much the society value undesirable outputs.  
 
We illustrate our analytical findings with implications of the Finnish water protection policy measures on 
agricultural production. In purpose of alleviating leakage of phosphorus and nitrogen to the waters, the 
Finnish authorities have imposed restrictions on animal farms that limit the use of manure (here it is 
assumed that one unit manure causes one unit compound bad output). With certain exceptions, maximally 
15 m
3 manure is allowed to be spread per hectare cultivated land annually. If this policy measure is 
restrictive, the performance of the farms changes as the environment becomes a factor to be taken into 
account in the economic maximization problem. Furthermore, since this also means that the authorities 
hold the view that an undesirable by-product is produced its effects on the environment has negative 
welfare consequences that should be accounted for in monetary terms, which may be quantified using a 
shadow pricing approach. The environmental regulation on manure spreading and its implicit shadow 
pricing is illustrated in Figure1.  
 
Initially, the farm maximizes profits subject to no environmental constraints and, therefore, chooses to 
operate at point A, where the produced good and bad output quantities are y and b, respectively. The farm 
has no concern about b affecting the environment, causing eutrophication, nuisance, etc. At point A the 
farm makes no effort to reduce emissions, i.e., there is no abatement cost and the shadow price of bad 
output equals zero. Therefore, to reduce the leakage quantity from b to b', the authorities introduce a 
policy measure that restricts the use of manure. Then, given that the farm still maximizes profits it has to 
adjust to point A’. 
 
 
Figure 1.Illustration of environmental policy and its relation to shadow pricing  
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At  point  A’,  the  relative  shadow  price  of  bad  output  is  q’/p,  which  reflects  the  marginal  rate  of 
transformation between bad and good outputs. This means that the shadow price reflects the revenue 
forgone, y p b q ¶ × = ×¶ - ) ' ( , due to the last reduced unit of bad output,  1 - = ¶b  As such, the shadow price 
t can be interpreted as the marginal abatement cost at point A’.  
 
Additionally, and in line with the formal theoretical discussion above, it is assumed in Figure 1 that the 
authorities know the environmental preferences of the society, and know how and the extent to which 
undesirable  output  affects  the  environment.  Therefore,  the  authorities  introduce  the  socially  optimal 
manure restriction, b , which equalizes the marginal utility, Ub, with the marginal abatement cost, q, from 
reducing bad output. Then, by estimating q, we implicitly reveal that the last unit manure spread on land 
causes the society negative external effects, or environmental damages, at the value of of q = Ub. This 
follows from the externalities being fully (optimally) internalized by the restrictionb . 
 
 
3 Empirical analysis  
 
The shadow-pricing methodology 
To calculate shadow prices of bad outputs, in our case manure, a shadow-pricing model originating from 
Färe  et  al.  (2001),  Färe  and  Grosskopf  (2004),  and  Färe  et  al.  (2004)  is  used.
2  Formally,  let 
M
M y y y + Â Î = ) ,..., ( 1  and 
J
J b b b + Â Î = ) ,..., ( 1  be vectors of good and bad outputs, respectively, and 
let 
N
N x x x + Â Î = ) ,..., ( 1  be a vector of inputs. The technology of reference is the output possibilities set, 
) (x P , which for a given vector of inputs denotes all technically feasible output vectors. This output set is 
assumed  to  be  convex  and  compact  with  } 0 , 0 { ) 0 ( = P .  Furthermore,  inputs  and  good  outputs  are 
assumed  to  be  freely  disposable  and  bad  outputs  only  weakly  disposable.  Finally,  good  outputs  are 
assumed to be null-joint with the bad outputs. This means that good outputs cannot be produced without 
producing bad outputs. The directional output distance function is defined on  ) (x P , as 
 
(16)     ( ) ( ) ( ) { }
J
b
M
y b y g g x P g b g y g b y x D + + Â Î Â Î Î × - × + = , , , : max ; , , b b b
b
 
 
which  then  inherits  its  properties  from  ) (x P .  The  solution, 
* b , gives the  maximum expansion and 
contraction of good outputs and bad outputs, respectively. The vector  ) 1 , 1 ( - = - = = b y g g g  specifies 
the direction in which an output vector,  ) ( ) , ( x P b y Î , is scaled so as to reach the boundary of the output 
set  at  ) ( ) , ( x P g b g y b y Î × - × +
* * b b ,  where  ) ; , , ( g b y x D =
* b .  This  means  that  the  producer 
becomes more technically  efficient  when simultaneously increasing good  outputs  and decreasing bad 
outputs.  The  distance  function  takes the  value  of zero for technically efficient output vectors on the 
boundary of  ) (x P , whereas positive values apply to inefficient output vectors below the boundary. The 
higher the value the more inefficient is the output vector. Finally, the directional output distance function 
satisfies the translation property 
 
(17)  ( ) ( ) a a a - = × - × + g b y x D g g b g y x D b y ; , , ; , ,        
where a  is a positive scalar. 
When  deriving  the  output  shadow-pricing  model  the  duality  between  the  distance  function  and  the 
revenue function is exploited. Let 
M
M p p p + Â Î = ) ,..., ( 1  and 
J
J q q q - Â Î = ) ,..., ( 1  represent absolute 
                                                            
2 Marklund (2003) provides an application of this model to the Swedish pulp industry, together with a thorough 
overview of the development of the estimations of bad output shadow prices. See also Marklund and Samakovlis 
(2003) and Marklund (2004).   8 
prices of good and bad outputs, respectively. Then the relative shadow prices of bad outputs, in terms of 
the m:th good output, can be calculated from  
 
(18)  J j
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which is the marginal rate of transformation between the  th j :  bad output and the  th m:  good output, 
MRTjm,  where  0 ) ( < ¶ × ¶ m y D   and  0 ) ( ³ ¶ × ¶ j b D .  The  shadow  price  is  then  measured  in  terms  of 
decreased production of ym, which has to be met when reducing bj marginally. 
 
The empirical specification model 
Following, e.g., Färe et al. (2004) the directional output distance function is parameterised by using a 
quadratic flexible functional form and estimated using an econometric, COLS estimating, procedure
3 This 
means that the distance function is first estimated by OLS and then ‘corrected’ by adding the largest 
residual to the intercept. The corrected distance function, CD(.), takes non-negative values and can be 
written as 
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where  k k  and  t t  are parameters representing farm and time specific effects, respectively. This is the 
expression to differentiate when calculating shadow prices of outputs, in accordance with equation (18). 
The  functional  form  in  (19)  satisfies  symmetry,  n n n n ¢ ¢ =a a ,  n n ¢ ¹ ,  m m m m ¢ ¢ = b b ,  m m ¢ ¹ ,  and 
j j j j ¢ ¢ =g g ,  j j ¢ ¹ , and the translation property in equation (17). 
 
Finally,  the  distance  function  in  (19)  is  separately  estimated  on  observations  from  conventional  and 
organic farming, respectively. In the former case good output is denoted y = C and in the latter case the 
notation is y = G. As for the rest, the same variables are included in both estimations. Manure is denoted 
b1, and x1 denotes capital, x2 labour, x3 energy, x4 land, and x5 other materials.  
 
Data 
The  original  farm  level  data  are  from  Finnish  bookkeeping  farms  that  participated  in  the  Farm 
Accountancy Data Network (FADN) during 1994-2002. The selected conventional and organic samples 
consist of farms that have a share of livestock return of total return that is at least 60 percent. They are 
considered to be livestock (milk and beef) specialized farms. Furthermore, farms for which there only is 
                                                            
3 Regarding the COLS estimator, see, e.g., Greene (1993). The particular approach adopted is used in Lovell et al. 
(1994), where, e.g., a Shephard output distance function is estimated. The COLS procedure applied on the directional 
output distance function is in more detail described in Marklund and Samakovlis (2003).   9 
one single observation are excluded. This results in unbalanced panels, extending over the period 1994-
2002 and consisting of 2094 observations for 261 conventional farms and 224 observations for 51 organic 
farms.
4 The directional output distance function is estimated on input and output variables constituting 
these panels. Following Färe et al. (2004, p. 12), the input and output variables are mean normalized 
before estimation. Descriptive statistics for the variables are provided in Appendix, Table A1. 
 
 
4 Results 
The directional output distance function is estimated on mean normalized data, using a COLS procedure. 
From the theory section we know that for the distance function to be well-behaved certain properties need 
to be fulfilled. In the particular COLS estimating procedure used the properties of translation, symmetry, 
and the function being non-negative are imposed, but null-jointness and monotonicity are only tested for 
afterwards. Our results from the estimations show that null-jointness is satisfied for 57 and 85 percent of 
the observations on conventional and organic farms, respectively. Monotonicity in good and bad outputs 
is fully satisfied for both types of farms. The parameters of the estimated distance functions are provided 
in Appendix, Table A2.
5 
 
In Table 1 the results for the representative farm in the conventional and organic farming sectors are 
provided. In both cases, at these particular points of evaluation, the estimated directional output distance 
function satisfies all the theoretical assumptions made (except for the monotonicity condition in some 
inputs, i.e., the derivatives with respect to the input show a negative sign).
6 
 
Table 1. Figures at mean of data for representative animal farms.
7 
Conventional farms   
Point estimate 
Standard error  t-value  Confidence interval 
q1/p1  -686.35  31.33  -21.90  -747.76 … –624.93 
CD(.)  0.53  0.005  111.83  0.52 … 0.54 
1 y  = 354097 FIM,  1 b  = 623 m
3 
 
Organic farms   
Point estimate 
Standard error  t-value  Confidence interval 
q1/p1  -635.33  95.17  -6.68  -821.86 … -448.80 
CD(.)  0.17  0.03  6.11  0.12 … 0.23 
1 y  = 304248 FIM,  1 b  = 665.56491 m
3 
 
During 1994-2002, the representative conventional animal farm was significantly technically inefficient. 
It could have increased the good output production from FIM 354097 to 354097 + 0.529829*354097 = 
FIM 541708 (52.9829 %), using the same technology, and without using larger input quantities. Similarly, 
the  manure  production  could  have  been  reduced  from  623  m
3  to  623  -  0.529829*623  =  293  m
3. 
Furthermore, when having reached the frontier, this particular farm could have reduced the emissions of 
                                                            
4 As some farms switch from conventional to organic production, and vice versa, during the period in study, the may 
show up in both samples, but not in the same year. 
 
5 Additionally, to check for possible multicollinearity problems the condition number (see e.g., Greene, 2000) of 
conventional and organic farming data matrixes are calculated, revealing the test statistic values 225 and 396, 
respectively. Even though Kmenta (1997) suggests that values larger than 30 should be interpreted as 
multicollinearity being present, the test results are fairly good, considering that flexible functional forms are 
representing the farm technologies. 
6 Descriptive statistics for estimated shadow prices and efficiency scores are provided in Appendix, Table A3. 
7 The test statistics have been obtained by applying the Delta test procedure, which is based on Taylor series 
approximation. A thorough description of this test is given in, e.g., Greene (2000).   10 
one  unit  (m
3)  manure  by  reducing  good  output  at  the  value  of  FIM  686.349.  Furthermore,  also  the 
representative organic animal farm was significantly technically inefficient. It could have increased good 
output production from FIM 304248 to 304248 + 0.170394*304248 = FIM 356090 (17.0394 %), using 
the same technology, and without using larger input quantities. The manure production could have been 
reduced from 666 m
3 to 666 - 0.170394*666 = 552.5176 m
3. In this case, the organic farm could have 
reduced the emissions of one unit manure by reducing good output at the value of FIM 635.332, after 
having reached the frontier. 
 
In general, the representative organic farm is found to be more technically efficient relative to its own 
technological frontier than is the conventional representative farm. This is statistically confirmed, as the 
confidence intervals for the efficiency point estimates do not overlap, and in line with the results in Oude 
Lansink  et  al.  (2002).
8  However,  there  is  no  statistical  indication of a difference  between  these  two 
particular  farms  in  valuing  manure  at  the  margin.  This  means  that  there  is  no  difference  regarding 
marginal abatement costs, and that we cannot reject the hypothesis of the Finnish authorities pursuing a 
cost-efficient manure policy. Improved environmental quality from reducing the use of one m
3 manure is 
as valuable irrespective of which type of farm that is accomplishing the reduction. The result indicate that 
this particular value is by the Finnish authorities set somewhere at FIM 449-882. Finally, the conclusions 
generally drawn on the representative farms would also be drawn from the average figures of shadow 
prices and efficiency scores, provided in Appendix, Table A3. 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an analytical framework that gives guiding principles about the 
stringency of environmental standards, imposed on farmers in the agricultural sector. Basically, we show 
that  all  the  information  needed  can  be  obtained  from  estimating  production  technology  on  farm 
performance generated data. 
   
To illustrate our analytical findings, we consider the implications of water protection policy measures in 
the Finnish agriculture. The use of manure is a source of environmentally undesirable by-products, e.g., 
leakage of phosphorous and nitrogen to the waters and, therefore, farms are allowed to spread maximally 
15 m
3 phosphorus per hectare cultivated land. If the farmers perceive the measure as restrictive they 
experience marginal abatement costs, and the higher these costs the more stringent the environmental 
demand. 
   
The marginal abatement costs are estimated using a shadow-pricing model that is derived from farm 
production  technology,  approximated  by  the  estimated  directional  output  distance  function.  This 
particular  function  measures  technical  efficiency,  which  tells  us  how  efficient  the  farmers  use  their 
resources. Furthermore, if it includes undesirable by-products, the environment is counted for among 
these resources.    
   
The shadow-pricing is based on a straightforward assumption that the current environmental regulation 
reflects the environmental preferences of the society. This assumption originates from the very basic 
result within economic theory, that marginal abatement costs from reducing environmentally detrimental 
by-products should equal the marginal utility from the resulting environmental improvement. Therefore, 
the  estimated  marginal  abatement  costs  implicitly  reveals  the  value,  or  the  shadow  price,  that  the 
regulatory authorities put on the environmental improvement when imposing restriction on undesirable 
emissions.  As  such,  shadow-pricing,  as  suggested  in  this  paper,  provides  a  tool  for  evaluating  the 
stringency of current environmental regulation, as it makes it possible to compare the society' s revenue 
from improved environmental quality with the cost (reduced farm revenue) that is associated with this 
particular improvement. The shadow-pricing approach adopted also makes it possible to evaluate whether 
pursued environmental policy is cost efficient. 
                                                            
8 Oude Lansink et al. (2002) use an input based data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach to study efficiency and 
productivity of Finnish crop and livestock farms during 1994-1997.   11 
The results show that the representative organic farm used the resources more efficiently relative to its 
own conditions than the representative conventional farm did during 1994-2002. This result is in line with 
earlier research on Finnish agriculture. However, there is no indication of a difference between these two 
particular farms in valuing manure at the margin, i.e., marginal abatement costs. This means that we 
cannot rule out that the Finnish regulatory authorities pursued a cost-efficient manure policy during the 
period in study. The results further indicate that the authorities valued the environmental damages from 
one m
3 manure spread on land to somewhere at FIM 449-882 (2000 constant prices). 
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Appendix 
 
Table  A1.  Descriptive  statistics  per  year  for  variables  in  the  output  distance  function,  representing 
conventional farm technology; mean and standard deviations (in parentheses). 
Variables  Year  Number 
of obs  C  b1  x1  x2  x3  x4  x5 
1994  251  324.92 
(128.40) 
602.45 
(265.67) 
342.84 
(275.18) 
4848.27 
(1455.27) 
27.27 
(12.71) 
31.45 
(15.07) 
153.49 
(84.52) 
1995  248  308.61 
(132.25) 
608.02 
(259.51) 
354.40 
(267.97) 
4935.88 
(1508.50) 
31.26 
(15.24) 
33.29 
(16.44) 
159.29 
(75.22) 
1996  247  344.26 
(147.19) 
627.85 
(268.80) 
387.88 
(280.08) 
4913.66 
(1486.50) 
29.53 
(14.27) 
35.11 
(17.68) 
158.25 
(75.64) 
1997  237  361.21 
(15.82) 
656.47 
(278.92) 
426.21 
(314.98) 
4945.83 
(1516.07) 
28.18 
(14.30) 
35.97 
(17.64) 
167.33 
(88.06) 
1998  241  322.01 
(146.24) 
676.34 
(306.58) 
474.29 
(338.27) 
5064.13 
(1617.25) 
27.02 
(19.07) 
38.29 
(20.08) 
189.07 
(112.79) 
1999  235  343.65 
(162.22) 
692.39 
(303.50) 
538.84 
(375.28) 
4927.40 
(1479.63) 
25.69 
(15.81) 
39.59 
(19.76) 
203.34 
(111.40) 
2000  226  383.99 
(191.10) 
556.25 
(299.21) 
583.96 
(428.78) 
5050.85 
(1591.97) 
24.04 
(14.06) 
41.20 
(20.81) 
220.26 
(125.02) 
2001  220  393.76 
(201.07) 
575.65 
(318.44) 
626.16 
(468.33) 
4874.15 
(1615.70) 
27.39 
(15.24) 
43.69 
(21.97) 
250.76 
(141.27) 
2002  189  428.47 
(232.48) 
603.99 
(340.08) 
676.70 
(530.15) 
4843.77 
(1563.94) 
28.78 
(16.09) 
45.21 
(23.38) 
256.91 
(153.96) 
99-02  2094  354.10 
(170.48) 
623.15 
(295.24) 
482.01 
(384.06) 
4935.30 
(1534.88) 
27.71 
(15.37) 
37.89 
(19.64) 
192.76 
(114.74) 
Min  -  3.83  96.00  7.99  988.00  4.33  8.52  31.80 
Max  -  1173.48  2292.00  2938.44  11921.00  163.64  135.44  1025.86 
 
y = C = outputs, except direct payments, 1000 FIM (2000 constant prices) 
b1 = manure, m3 
x1 = capital, machinery and buildings, 1000 FIM (2000 constant prices) 
x2 = labour, hours 
x3 = energy, fuel and electricity, 1000 FIM (2000 constant prices) 
x4 = land, arable area, hectare 
x5 = other material, 1000 FIM (2000 constant prices) 
   14 
 
Table  A1  (continuing).  Descriptive  statistics  per  year  for  variables  in  the  output  distance  function, 
representing organic farm technology, mean and standard deviations (in parentheses). 
Variables  Year  Number 
of obs  G  b1  x1  x2  x3  x4  x5 
1994  20  299.33 
(143.90) 
629.17 
(313.72) 
335.41 
(175.31) 
4436.55 
(1067.49) 
28.13 
(14.18) 
36.47 
(17.81) 
150.08 
(85.74) 
1995  23  253.90 
(143.93) 
577.77 
(312.11) 
320.00 
(197.84) 
4368.30 
(1217.00) 
29.29 
(12.78) 
37.49 
(17.17) 
147.17 
(70.41) 
1996  27  300.93 
(172.21) 
647.33 
(370.86) 
368.02 
(233.34) 
4594.52 
(1494.39) 
30.20 
(14.13) 
39.92 
(23.75) 
158.17 
(96.46) 
1997  30  254.01 
(143.41) 
623.90 
(362.52) 
399.21 
(269.25) 
4197.77 
(1577.12) 
27.72 
(14.92) 
43.03 
(29.57) 
145.82 
(96.81) 
1998  18  229.40 
(111.69) 
629.51 
(299.91) 
458.76 
(366.01) 
4595.28 
(1349.59) 
29.87 
(20.99) 
47.02 
(36.94) 
144.21 
(63.89) 
1999  25  286.90 
(198.45) 
734.20 
(434.02) 
584.90 
(419.56) 
4753.80 
(1684.95) 
26.30 
(13.67) 
51.85 
(39.53) 
188.34 
(155.07) 
2000  25  351.75 
(290.47) 
659.43 
(399.21) 
725.81 
(473.65) 
4564.44 
(1987.56) 
30.08 
(21.50) 
55.87 
(41.14) 
222.07 
(209.41) 
2001  28  359.54 
(268.38) 
728.39 
(466.57) 
778.37 
(446.99) 
4556.61 
(2012.58) 
28.86 
(17.99) 
54.92 
(33.93) 
257.52 
(191.52) 
2002  28  372.05 
(289.11) 
730.46 
(457.71) 
796.92 
(413.59) 
4482.04 
(1981.66) 
30.37 
(14.78) 
58.82 
(37.15) 
263.66 
(220.59) 
99-02  224  304.25 
(212.97) 
665.56 
(387.27) 
540.69 
(394.34) 
4499.73 
(1639.17) 
28.97 
(16.01) 
47.70 
(32.56) 
189.65 
(153.71) 
Min  -  1.51  140.50  49.95  1159.00  5.74  12.30  21.42 
Max  -  1418.05  2234.00  1622.71  10855.00  98.58  178.41  1016.71 
 
y = G = outputs, except direct payments, 1000 FIM (2000 constant prices) 
b1 = manure, m3 
x1 = capital, machinery and buildings, 1000 FIM (2000 constant prices) 
x2 = labour, hours 
x3 = energy, fuel and electricity, 1000 FIM (2000 constant prices) 
x4 = land, arable area, hectare 
x5 = other material, 1000 FIM (2000 constant prices)   15 
Table A2. Parameter estimates of the mean normalized output distance function, representing animal 
farm technology.
 9 
Coefficient  Variable  Organic 
Estimate (t-value) 
Conventional 
Estimate (t-value) 
a0  Intercept  0.02 (0.14)  -0.22 (-3.85) 
a1  x1  -0.02 (-0.17)  0.03 (1.41) 
a2  x2  -0.03 (-0.15)  -0.02 (-0.28) 
a3  x3  -0.25 (-2.13)  0.04 (1.65) 
a4  x4  -0.42 (-2.74)  -0.05 (-1.21) 
a5  x5  0.07 (0.59)  0.04 (1.27) 
b1  y1  -0.37 (-3.47)  -0.38 (-13.85) 
g1=b1+1  b1  0.63   0.62  
a11  x1x1  -0.11 (-1.52)  0.01 (0.60) 
a12  x1x2  0.09 (1.20)  -0.12 (-5.81) 
a13  x1x3  0.03 (0.53)  -0.002 (-0.22) 
a14  x1x4  -0.10 (-1.82)  0.05 (3.39) 
a15  x1x5  0.16 (1.63)  -0.07 (-6.50) 
d11  x1y1  -0.03 (-0.51)  0.05 (5.41) 
h11=d11  x1b1  -0.03   0.05  
a22  x2x2  -0.10 (-0.33)  -0.01 (-0.14) 
a23  x2x3  0.20 (1.81)  -0.12 (-4.43) 
a24  x2x4  0.04 (0.43)  0.17 (4.48) 
a25  x2x5  0.01 (0.08)  -0.04 (-1.64) 
d21  x2y1  -0.08 (-0.72)  0.09 (3.77) 
h21=d21  x2b1  -0.08   0.09  
a33  x3x3  0.24 (2.42)  0.02 (2.40) 
a34  x3x4  -0.15 (-2.02)  0.02 (1.41) 
a35  x3x5  0.06 (0.64)  -0.02 (-1.19) 
d31  x3y1  -0.12 (-1.91)  0.02 (1.78) 
h31=d31  x3b1  -0.12   0.02  
a44  x4x4  0.63 (4.84)  -0.01 (-0.31) 
a45  x4x5  -0.12 (-1.56)  0.02 (0.89) 
d41  x4y1  -0.04 (-0.59)  -0.10 (-6.79) 
h41=d41  x4b1  -0.04   -0.10  
a55  x5x5  -0.08 (-0.67)  -0.11 (-5.13) 
d51  x5y1  -0.02 (-0.25)  0.12 (8.20) 
h51=d51  x5b1  -0.02   0.12  
b11  y1y1  0.12 (1.77)  -0.12 (-7.62) 
m11=b11  y1b1  0.12   -0.12  
g11=b11  b1b1  0.12   -0.12  
  
                                                            
9 The parameter estimates of the farm and time effects are left out.   16 
Table A3. Descriptive statistics per year for shadow prices and efficiency scores in the animal farming 
sector; mean and standard deviations (in parentheses). 
Conventional farms  Organic farms 
Year  obs  CD(.)  q/pC  obs  CD(.)  q/pG 
1994  251  0.51224 
(0.070433) 
-687.42304 
(181.0388) 
20  0.26252 
(0.061473) 
-735.12760 
(284.08037) 
1995  248  0.51224 
(0.079838) 
-708.23887 
(173.50215) 
23  0.26252 
(0.067701) 
-635.49979 
(175.10245) 
1996  247  0.51224 
(0.080657) 
-655.35017 
(167.34997) 
27  0.26252 
(0.060012) 
-680.68317 
(195.31854) 
1997  237  0.51224 
(0.071300) 
-643.52064 
(173.46114) 
30  0.26252 
(0.076635) 
-655.15216 
(163.06504) 
1998  241  0.51224 
(0.086699) 
-710.25169 
(191.24356) 
18  0.26252 
(0.072487) 
-593.74175 
(196.15436) 
1999  235  0.51224 
(0.081015) 
-704.83961 
(189.91634) 
25  0.26252 
(0.069189 
-699.65931 
(277.07233) 
2000  226  0.51224 
(0.097851) 
-778.28325 
(197.65626) 
25  0.26252 
(0.10795) 
-703.10685 
(459.74301) 
2001  220  0.51224 
(0.099568) 
-816.39407 
(249.83025) 
28  0.26252 
(0.075920) 
-894.63667 
(1304.36948 
2002  189  0.51224 
(0.098094) 
-776.19692 
(220.09811) 
28  0.26252 
(0.075410) 
-847.74530 
(1061.9017) 
99-02  2094  0.51224 
(0.084908) 
-717.08707 
(201.03786) 
224  0.26252 
(0.074256) 
-722.74669 
(634.83996) 
Min  -  0.00000  -2286.22217  -  0.00000  -7491.56348 
Max  -  1.14533  -41.23663  -  0.44128  -178.43460 
 
CD(.) = efficiency scores 
q/pC = shadow price of manure in terms of FIM good output in the conventional animal sector (in 2000 
constant prices) 
q/pG  = shadow  price of manure in terms  of  FIM good  output in  the organic animal  sector (in  2000 
constant prices) 
 
 